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Dasher Wheatly and Australia in Vietnam,
Northern Territory University Press, Darwin.
ISBN 1876248106 rrp: $19.95.
Review Essay by Peter McGregor
University of Western Sydney - Nepean
I an Walters, an anthropologist, presents an analysis of thesignificance of the death of an Australian soldier during the
American War in Viet Nam. In order to interpret Dasher (Kevin)
Wheatley's death, Walters provides two dimensions of context:
(a) a concise, accurate and astute analysis of the political history
of the war, and of the USA and Australian interventions; and (b)
the theoretical tools he uses - namely cultural studies, deriving,
Walters claims, from an anthropological understanding of culture,
and specifically the techniques of semiotic and content analysis
of pertinent newspaper coverage. The strength of his book is the
rigorous empirical measurement of the levels and nature of news
coverage. However, Walters' general assumption that news reports
can be taken as the measure of significance, as the key index for
the public reception of particular happenings, is questionable.
My analysis will draw attention to the use of terminology:
even descriptive terms can be expressive of otherwise covert
points-of-view. For instance, Walters, like most western
researchers, has yet to acknowledge that Viet Nam is two words
(surname Viet, given name Nam as Trinh T. Minh-ha's film puts
it). One of the few academic journals to acknowledge this 'reality'
is the USA-based Viet Nam Generation (editor Kali Tal). This is
despite the regular use, by Walters and most researchers, of
acronyms that reveal the Vietnamese linguistic structure. For
example, the government in South Viet Nam was known as the
RVN (Republic of Viet Nam), and the government in the North
was known as the DRVN (Democratic Republic of Viet Nam);
similarly Hanoi should be Ha Noi, Saigon -- Sai Gon, Danang--
Da Nang, etc.
The initial military commitments of both the USA and
Australia were of 'advisers' j'instructors'. While Walters
acknowledges that "their assignment theoretically prohibited their
engagement in battle" (p.ll; my emphasis, cited in 1983),he doesn't
follow through on his exposure of the failure - in practice - of this
prohibition. Australia's first contingent of military advisers was I
deployed in (South) Viet Nam in mid-1962. It wasn't until mid- I
1965 that USA and Australian combat troops - who were meant to
engage in battle - were also deployed in (South) Viet Nam. The
use of Orwellian doublespeak and euphemisms during the War
was apparent in such official terminologies. The Australian
military advisers/instructors were called the Australian Army I
Training Team Vietnam (AATIV) - the euphemistic term being
'training'. Whereas the USA advisory effort (some 12,000advisers
by the end of 1963),was called the United States MilitaryAssistance
Command Vietnam (USMACV) - 'assistance' being the
euphemistic term here.
In his third chapter, entitled Death of a Legend, Walters
depicts the circumstances surrounding the death of two Australian
advisers: Dasher Wheatley and his 'mate', Butch Swanton. In
February 1965 Wheatley had been both promoted to Warrant
Officer 2nd Class, and posted to Viet Nam for 'service' with the
AAITV. By November 1965 Wheatley, Swanton and five other
Australian Warrant Officers were a 'team' attached to a USA Army
Special Forces camp in Tra Bong, in I Corps, the USA's northern
organisational sector of South Viet Nam. The camp also included
a Vietnamese Special Forces team, a company of Vietnamese and
another company of Montagnards; the commander of the whole
outpost was an Australian, Captain Felix Fazekas. All the
Australians were from the AATTV. The camp, according to
Australia journalist Denis Warner, was a "wonderful
success"(p.44), destabilising the previously strong Viet Cong area
through their vigorous patrolling attacks. Wheatley had acquired
a reputation as an outstanding soldier, for bravery but also for
compassion.
On 13 November 1965,on a 'search and destroy' patrol of a I
local Viet Cong hamlet, Wheatley and Swanton's platoon was
pinned down under heavy fire. Swanton, going to the aid of a
wounded Vietnamese soldier, was himself severely wounded.
Wheatley in turn went to the aid of Swanton, got him to partial
cover, and in desperation radioed for assistance. Their Vietnamese
medic, having dressed Swanton's wounds retired, and the last
Vietnamese soldier, having pleaded with Wheatley to run, saying
there was nothing that could be done for Swanton, also left. I
Wheatley and Swanton were found the next morning lying next
to each other, killed by shots to the head. The AATIV was known
for its code of mateship - a 'buddy relationship' to the Americans
- especially in battle situations they worked in pairs. Walters





proceeds to analyse Wheatley's death as a hero, within the Anzac
tradition of Australians as good soldiers, and explicitly invoking
the ethos of 'mateship'. The immediate Australian news media
coverage of the two Australians was quite small- in terms merely
of their deaths. As their mateship and heroism quickly became
known, the coverage became more extensive. It included the
prompt awarding of medals - and of the same level to both
Wheatley and Swanton - by the South Vietnamese authorities.
However, Walters suggests the overall swamping of this story by
other current stories indicates how lithe war was not of high
concerrr'{p.oz), at that time for Australia.
Subsequent speculation that Wheatley may be awarded a
Victoria Cross (VC) led to a further increase in media attention,
culminating eventually in the peak of the incident's coverage in
December 1966,when Wheatley was awarded the Vc. For Walters,
the deaths finally achieved "genuine newsworthiness'{p.Zz), with
the awarding of the VC, despite the lack of any new information
('news') about the deaths. Rather, Walters argues, it was the
awarding of the VC that generated this increased newsworthiness.
Walters goes on to eventually place almost metaphysical powers
on the VC as 'material culture', as if it is a fetish object. A report of
the awarding of the medal in The Age newspaper is revealing: no
mention is made of Swanton's heroism/mateship in trying to
rescue his Vietnamese 'mate'; Swanton and Wheatley merely
IIaccompanied" the search and destroy operation, while no
mention is made of that other Australian 'adviser', Captain
Fazekas, being the commander of the operation (p.77-79)
Yet Walters' next chapter, Two Other Tragedies, would
appear to undermine his own argument about the crucial role the
VC played in the newsworthiness of the deaths. The death of the
I first Australian conscript, Private Errol Noack, towards the end
i of May 1966, scored headlines and the most extensive Australian
I coverage of the war up till then. While the sending of (Australian)
troops to Viet Nam in mid 1962 had been uncontroversial,
generating very little coverage (p.18 and 21), from the introduction
of conscription (for overseas service), in November 1964,
conscription had been "a big political issuel/(p.98). Despite the
quantity of the coverage of Noack's death, Walters notes that his
killing by Australian fire went unreported. Then in mid-August
1966 came the battle of Long Tan. While 18 Australian soldiers
were killed (11 of them being conscripts), and 26 were wounded,
the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese lost over 200 dead (estimates
vary). As Walters says: "Long Tan was such a shock, such a big
issue for the Australian media, that the fervour of reporting
continued for days" (p.101). After Noack's death and the battle at
Long Tan, the war was now on the media's - and hence the public's
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- agenda in Australia. Also a Federal election was looming, where I
the war came to be a prominent part of the Coalition government's
campaign.
Unfortunately Walters doesn't address the bona fides of the
Australian (and USA) 'commitments' to Viet Nam. Until the Gulf
of Tonkin 'incident' in August 1964, the USA government had no
legal rationale/pre-text to wage what was to continue as an
undeclared war in Viet Nam. Similarly for the Australian
government war was never declared, and officially the Australian
intervention was a 'police action'. (Hence some of the difficulties
Viet Nam Veterans had in joining the RSL, and being
acknowledged - eg, for medical treatment, pensions, etc. - as
returned soldiers, from overseas 'service', in a war...) Could it be
that at the time of Wheatley and Swanton's deaths the Australian
government (with its compliant media as "mirror" (p.18)), had a
vested interest in minimising the 'incident' ? Could this perhaps
be more the reason for the 'incident's' initially quite minimal
newsworthiness ? Whereas, on the other hand, the "two other
tragedies" just couldn't be so easily contained and minimised?
And that yes, as Walters and others argue, 1965-1966 was a
"turning point" from "the cold war paralysis of public debate"(p.4)
and dissent, to the social changes and "public contestation"(p.25)
of the so-called sixties generation? My own memory - for what
it's worth, as someone who both lived through the war, and has
recently done research about the war - is of having heard of Noack,
but not of Wheatley...until Walters' book. Walters then examines
the November 1966 election, where, with the war and conscription
as two of the big issues, the Coalition romped back into power.
The conclusions that Walters reluctantly reaches about the
impact of the Wheatley/Swanton deaths upon Australian culture
are (a) that they were not very significant at the time - especially
when compared to both other Viet Nam War events, and also non-
Viet N am War events; and (b) not very significant - apart from the
attention now given by Walters' own study - since. For Walters,
and for the Australian military, those two deaths were highly
significant. Again, Walters isn't alone in depicting 'standing by
your mates' as the key attribute of being a (worthy) Australian.
Yet his case study of the Viet Nam war fails to confirm the I
continuance of this hitherto accepted archetype of Australian
identity. For people like WheatleyI Swanton, Walters, myself and
others of the Viet Nam generation, the heroic mateship of
Australian soldiers in the First and Second World Wars was part
of our cultural inheritance as Australians. I grew up knowing of
Simpson and his donkey at Gallipoli, of the rats of Tobruk, of the
Kokoda Trail. While the battle of Long Tan has been quite aptly
incorporated into the Australian/Anzac legend, the overall





Australian experience in Viet Nam is not one that can be so
easily incorporated. Walters would appear to acknowledge this
in his analysis of the macrocosm of the Australian (and American)
experience in Viet Nam. Yet it is as if he wants to attach kudos to
an exception that belies that macrocosm. This inconsistency in
his analysis is paralleled somewhat in his methodology: namely,
his assumption that the (public) significance of events lies in their
news coverage. This assumption ignores the separation between
the directly lived and its representation, between the war and its
reporting. This distinction was outlined, around the time of the
deaths Walters analyses, in Debord's Society oftheSpectacle (1967).
Yet Walters has readily acknowledged - and documented - the
limits of media presentations, particularly, as he puts it, concerning
the close links with conservatism and officialdom. The issues he
doesn't take up are often more revealing than the ones he does.
Walters concludes with a critique of the values of the (news)
media, and hence of Australian society's priorities. And it's true,
Wheatley - and Swanton - were heroes, demonstrating solidarity
and mateship with their colleagues. Wheatley for Swanton, but
also Swanton for his (unknown) Vietnamese 'mate'. Remember
how the South Vietnamese authorities treated Wheatley and
Swanton equally with their prompt awarding of the same medals.
Walters begins to explore the racism implicit in the awarding of
hero status and a VC only to Wheatley... Here Walters cites Ian
McNeill as if in explanation: that Swanton was just doing his job
(p.160), whereas Wheatley's behaviour was extraordinary,
"something else"(p.98). McNeill is one of the leading (Australian)
military historians of the war (with for instance, a book on the
AAITV). Now, while it may not be completely fair and/or apt to
equate the news media's values (ie., the calculus of
newsworthiness), with broader social/community values, they
are connected, if not necessarily in the direct and transparent -
and naive - manner that Walters suggests. For instance, in
December 1965, while speculation about Wheatley getting aVe
gained coverage, Australian cricketer Doug Walters, and Sonia
Hopkins' forthcoming marriage to Billy McMahon each generated
considerably more coverage. Walters decries this contrast as a
"contradiction" (p.140), and gets lost in his moral outrage at the
inadequacies of the coverage of war heroism.
Politicians of the Viet Nam war era, like Paul Hasluck and
Malcolm Fraser, and of course Menzies, should be held
accountable for the consequences of the racist arrogance of their
'forward defence' foreign policy - "fight the communist threat on
a distant (ie.someone else's!) shore"(p.14-16). A similar
accountability should be accorded to those responsible for the
military 'assistance' policy, that concealed western aggression
AsiaPacific MediaEducator, Issue No.5, July-December 1998
within the rhetoric of benevolent neo-colonialism. And then there's I
the military brass who designed the strategy to carry out those
policies. This is where, for instance, there needs to be more critical
investigation of the role of the AATIV than Walters and others
have given(p.153). While Wheatley's - and Swanton's - bravery
and compassion for "sticking up for your mates"(p.155), was
undoubtedly exceptional, it was the strategy and goals of
Australian intervention in Viet Nam that was both questionable
at the time, and is increasingly so in contemporary analyses of the
war. •
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